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1 Introduction
The adoption of a common currency by euro area member states has guar-
anteed a high degree of price stability. At the same time, however, member
states have lost the possibility to use monetary policy as a leeway to respond
to idiosyncratic shocks. While this drawback is intrinsic to being part of a
currency union, what makes the euro area different from other existing mon-
etary unions is that fiscal policy is still conducted at national level. The
coexistence of a common monetary policy and a decentralised fiscal policy
generates remarkable tensions in the euro area when it comes to absorbing
national idiosyncratic shocks. On the one hand, being part of a currency
union, member states cannot absorb idiosyncratic shocks through monetary
policy as opposed to countries which still keep monetary policy at national
level; on the other hand, not being part of a fiscal federation, they do not
receive fiscal transfers from a central budget as happens, for example, to US
states for state-level shocks or to German federal regions for regional shocks.
In the absence of some common fiscal capacity, shocks are mainly absorbed
through the issuance of national non-contingent debt. In spite of being a
powerful instrument to smooth consumption, debt is not intrinsically an in-
ternational risk sharing mechanism, unless it is traded across the borders.
That is why the recent financial and economic crises have endeavoured, on
the one side, the creation of new mechanisms to generate public international
risk sharing1, and, on the other side, the consolidation of newly founded insti-
tutions such as the Banking Union to boost private international risk sharing.
The lack of public risk sharing mechanisms is a major rationale behind the
proposal included in the Five Presidents’ Report (2015) regarding the creation
of a euro area fiscal capacity able to absorb asymmetric shocks.
Given this ambitious project at euro area level, it is crucial to quantify the
level of risk sharing across euro area members and to assess whether the adop-
tion of the euro has brought any change in the ability to share risk. Estimates
of risk sharing at euro area level already exist in the literature – see van Beers,
Bijlsma, and Zwart (2014), Kalemli-Ozcan, Luttini, and Sørensen (2014), and
Furceri and Zdzienicka (2015). However, to the best of our knowledge, no one
has yet tried to evaluate whether the adoption of the euro has had any impact
on the level of risk sharing across euro area member states and this is where
the contribution of our paper lies. In order to evaluate any possible effect of
the adoption of the euro on the level of risk sharing across euro area member
states we proceed in three steps. First, we generate a counterfactual dataset
for the scenario in which euro area countries had not adopted the common
currency. Then, we compute some preliminary measures of risk sharing both
with the actual and the counterfactual data in order to assess whether there
has been a change in risk sharing due to the adoption of the euro. Thirdly, we
attempt to decompose risk sharing into several different channels to evaluate
how risk sharing has changed with the euro. We now proceed to explain more
1For specific proposals on public international risk sharing institutions, see Abraham, Carceles-
Poveda, Liu, and Marimon (2016), Poghosyan, Senhadji, and Cottarelli (2016), Carnot, Evans,
Fatica, and Mourre (2015).
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in detail these three steps.
To begin with, there is a major obstacle to evaluating the effect of the adoption
of a common currency by euro area member states: the lack of an appropri-
ate set of countries to be used as a counterfactual pool for the scenario in
which the member states had not adopted the euro. We tackle this problem
by using the so called Synthetic Control Method (SCM). The main benefit of
this method is that it allows to build synthetic time series that can be used
in the absence of a natural counterfactual. Precisely for this reason, SCM is
exploited by the literature to estimate the effect of policy interventions when
it is not possible to have a real counterfactual.
After generating a synthetic dataset of time series as a counterfactual in the
scenario of no adoption of the common currency, our second step is to com-
pute some preliminary measures of risk sharing across euro area countries
both with the actual dataset of euro area countries’ variables and with their
synthetic counterparts. Our aim is to evaluate whether the adoption of the
euro has had any impact on the level of risk sharing across euro area countries.
We do so by computing difference in difference estimates of our measures of
risk sharing calculated using the actual and the synthetic series pre and post
adoption of the euro. Our measures of risk sharing are based on the following
theoretical prescription: the more risk is shared across countries, the less each
country’s consumption and GDP are correlated and the more the consump-
tion of two countries sharing risk are correlated. Consequently, we estimate
correlation between consumption and GDP of each of our countries, and the
correlation of consumption of all pairs of countries in our sample. The third
risk sharing measure that we adopt is the so called Brandt-Cochrane-Santa
Clara (BCS) Index, an indicator of bilateral risk sharing, which relies on the
similarity of stochastic discount factors across countries. If the adoption of
the euro has had any impact on risk sharing we should find that the difference
in difference estimates of our risk sharing measures are significant.
Once computed difference in difference estimates for correlations and BCS
indices and assessed the effect of the adoption of the common currency on
risk sharing across euro area countries, our third step is to decompose risk
sharing into different channels. In particular, our final goal is to assess which
of these channels have changed after the adoption of the euro as opposed
to the counterfactual scenario in which euro area countries had not adopted
the common currency. In order to better understand the channels through
which risk sharing is accomplished, we adopt the GDP variance decomposition
introduced by Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha (1996). This method allows
us to distinghuish four possible channels of risk sharing across countries: pri-
vate risk sharing through private cross-border investments, public risk sharing
through government taxes and transfers, private savings, and public savings.
It is worth noticing that international risk sharing happens only through the
fist two channels, i.e. cross-border investments and government transfers.
Our main result, which is robust to our different risk sharing measures and
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specifications, is that international risk sharing across euro area member states
through both private and public channels has not changed due to the adop-
tion of the common currency. Nonetheless, we find evidence of a decrease
in consumption smoothing across euro area countries in the period after the
introduction of the euro. Difference in difference estimates of the correlation
between the GDP and consumption of each country are positive, indicating
a reduction in consumption smoothing. Similarly, difference in difference es-
timates of bilateral consumption correlations and BCS indices are negative,
again pointing at a reduction in consumption smoothing. At the same time,
we report that the adoption of the common currency has had a positive effect
on GDP growth, which has been accompanied by an increase in output volatil-
ity. We interpret our result on the lower level of consumption smoothing after
the adoption of the common currency as follows: we attribute the lower con-
sumption smoothing to the inability of agents to insure against larger shocks
to GDP compared to the pre euro period. Furthermore, we provide evidence
of heterogeneous effects by splitting the sample of euro area member states
into core and periphery countries. We show that the euro has not affected
significantly consumption smoothing of core countries, whereas the aggregate
negative effect that we find for the whole sample of countries is due to a re-
duction in consumption smoothing for periphery member states. Finally, we
show that our results are robust to changes in the matching strategy, exclu-
sion of potentially affected units from the group of non euro area countries,
and changes of the year of euro adoption.
Related literature The SCM is first introduced by Abadie and Gardeaz-
abal (2003) to test for the impact of the outbreak of terrorism in the Basque
Country in the late 60s. Building on that seminal paper, it is further em-
ployed by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) to estimate the effect
of a large-scale tobacco control programme that California implemented in
1988. In addition, Billmeier and Nannicini (2012) use SCM to investigate the
impact of economic liberalisation on real GDP per capita in a worldwide sam-
ple of countries. Closer to our focus, Campos, Coricelli, and Moretti (2014)
make use of SCM to evaluate the benefits from being part of the European
Union, while Saia (2016) employs SCM to estimate counterfactual trade flows
between the UK and Europe if the UK had joined the euro.
Among the risk sharing measures that we use, there is the BCS index,
which is proposed by Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006). This is
an indicator of bilateral risk sharing which relies on the similarity of pricing
kernels. The BCS index is computed also by Rungcharoenkitkul (2011) to
assess risk sharing among some Asian countries in the first decade of the
2000s. In order to understand the channels through which risk sharing is
accomplished, we use the GDP variance decomposition presented by Asdrubali
et al. (1996). The latter paper introduces this methodology to identify risk
sharing channels in the US over the period 1963-1990. Later on, the GDP
variance decomposition is used by Furceri and Zdzienicka (2015) to analyze
and compare risk sharing among euro area countries with risk sharing across
the US states. The analysis of Furceri and Zdzienicka (2015) is updated with
more recent data by van Beers et al. (2014), who try to assess the functioning
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of insurance mechanisms in the euro area, and by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2014)
who separately consider countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis in 2010.
2 Methodology
2.1 The Synthetic Control Method
The main purpose of this paper is to assess whether the introduction of the
common currency has had any effects on the level of risk sharing between
member states. In order to meaningfully address this question, one would
need to estimate risk sharing between euro area member states under the al-
ternative scenario in which the currency area had not been established. Since
it is not possible to have a real counterfactual for this situation, we use the
SCM by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) to generate a synthetic counterpart.
This method is a data driven procedure that has been used to estimate the
effect of policy interventions in the absence of a natural counterfactual.
Our first step is to generate the synthetic counterpart of the following macroe-
conomic variables in per capita term: gross domestic product (GDP), house-
hold final consumption (C), government expenditure (G), national income
(NI), and disposable national income (DNI). We are going to use these vari-
ables to compute the measures of risk sharing across countries discussed in
sections 2.2 and 2.3. In order to compute the synthetic counterpart of our
macroeconomic variables of interest, we proceed as in Abadie and Gardeaza-
bal (2003). Let N be the number of countries in the potential counterfactual
pool, and let W = (wi)
N
i=1 an N×1 vector of country weights such that wi ≥ 0
and
∑
iwi = 1 for i = 1, ..., N . Moreover, let X1 be the K × 1 vector of our
variables of interest for euro area member states before the introduction of the
euro. Similarly, let X0 be the K ×N matrix values of the same K variables
of interest for all N non euro area countries in our counterfactual pool before
the introduction of the euro. In addition, let V be a K ×K diagonal matrix
with non negative components representing the relevance of our variables of
interest in determining the macroeconomic outcome variables. As discussed
in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), while the choice of the matrix V could be
arbitrarily based on economic considerations, here it is computed through a
factor model. Then, the algorithm of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) looks
for the vector W ∗ of weights that minimises (X1−X0W )′V (X1−X0W ), sub-
ject to wi ≥ 0 and
∑
iwi = 1 for i = 1, ..., N . The vector W
∗ determines the
linear combination of macroeconomic variables for non euro area countries,
which best reproduces each variable of interest for the euro area countries in
the period before the introduction of the euro. Therefore, let Y1 and Y0 be
the outcome variables for respectively the euro area and the non euro area
countries in our group of non euro area countries. Then, the method uses
Y ∗1 = Y0W ∗ as counterfactual for the outcome variables of euro area countries
after the introduction of the euro. The choice of the covariates in matrix X0
is such that it maximises the ability of the synthetic series to reproduce the
behaviour of the series of the euro area countries in the period before the in-
troduction of the euro. The baseline matching function always takes the past
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value of the variable we investigate. This means that if we are evaluating what
Portuguese consumption C would have been without Portugal being part of
the euro, we always start by matching on the consumption of Portugal in ev-
ery year before the introduction of the euro. To continue on the example, in
order to generate the counterfactual series of Portuguese C for the scenario in
which Portugal had not adopted the euro, the method uses the variables GDP,
C, G, NI, DNI of the non euro area countries in our sample and it chooses the
vector of weights W so as to minimise the distance between Portuguese C and
the combination of the macroeconomic variables we have at our disposal, in
the subsample before the introduction of the euro. Once we have a synthetic
series of Portuguese C which mimics the actual series in the matching period
before the euro, we can use that series as a counterfactual for Portuguese C
in the scenario where Portugal had not joined the euro in the period after the
introduction of the euro.
This method relies on two identification assumptions: 1) the choice of the
covariates on which the matching is carried out before the introduction of the
euro should be such that the variables that are able to mimic the pre euro
path are included, but do not rely on observables that anticipate the effect
of the introduction of the euro itself; 2) the variables concerning the group of
non euro area countries in our counterfactual pool should not be affected by
the adoption of the euro. For the latter reason, the matching is carried out
for one euro area country at the time, meaning that we iteratively drop all
but one euro area member state, so that the procedure always involves one
euro area country and N non-euro area countries.
A relevant assumption for the correct use of the SCM is that the non euro
area group is unaffected by the adoption of the euro. This assumption can be
troublesome since, given the magnitude of the potential effect of the euro, one
might indeed think that the introduction of the common currency indirectly
affected all countries in the world. This could be particularly true for the
countries in our non euro area group, which is made of OECD countries with
strong trade and financial linkages with our euro area sample. This concern
is legitimate if we look at the effect of the introduction of the euro itself.
However, one can think of the total effect of the euro for member states as
being made of two components: i) the effect of the mere existence of the euro;
ii) the effect of having adopted the euro and being a member of the currency
union. Under this decomposition, even though all countries in the world may
be subject to the first effect, only euro area member states are subject to the
second one. Hence, the effect that we want to analyse should be interpreted
as being the membership of the euro, conditional on the existence of the euro.
The intuition behind this method is that one can use the best linear combina-
tion of synthetic series in terms of matching the behaviour of actual series as a
counterfactual for the national account aggregates of the euro area countries
after the adoption of the euro. It is worth mentioning that the evaluation
of the robustness of these estimates has been discussed in the literature, but
no analytical result is available to compute the standard deviation of these
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estimates, namely because the estimated component is the weighing vector.
Robustness checks can then be carried out in three possible ways: i) per-
forming bootstrap, by randomly resampling the donor pool of non euro area
countries (see Saia (2016)); ii) estimating a difference in difference regression
and testing whether the outcome is significantly different from zero (see Cam-
pos et al. (2014)); iii) running placebo studies on units in the donor pool in
order to assess whether the method delivers spurious effect of the adoption of
the euro. We will use all these techniques in order to check the robustness of
our results.
2.2 Bilateral Correlations and the BCS Index
Economic theory predicts that, under the assumption of no arbitrage and
complete markets, countries fully share risk. This has two major implica-
tions. Firstly, idiosyncratic shocks to income in a country are not trans-
mitted to the consumption in the same country as they are fully insulated.
In other words, even if a country’s income is volatile, its consumption level
should remain unchanged. Secondly, the stochastic discount factors (hence-
forth SDFs) of two countries which fully share risk are equalised – see for
example Cochrane (2001). Put it differently, let Mi,t = βu
′(ci,t+1)/u′(ci,t)
and Mj,t = βu
′(cj,t+1)/u′(cj,t) be the SDF of country i and country j. Un-
der complete markets, it has to hold that Mi,t = Mj,t. In this situation, the
growth of marginal utility is perfectly correlated across individuals. More
specifically, if preferences u and discount factors β are assumed to be the
same across countries, the growth rate of consumption is identical. Whenever
the assumption of complete markets is violated, there are two consequences.
On the one hand, part of the income volatility of a country is transmitted to
consumption, so full insulation of consumption from variations in income no
longer applies. On the other hand, SDFs between countries are not equalised
and part of the risk remains untraded. What individuals seek to do in this
case is to use all available assets to share the biggest possible portion of risk.
Put differently, by trading the available assets they seek to get the SDF of the
two countries as close as possible – see Svensson (1988). With this theoreti-
cal background in mind, we start our analysis by computing three potential
measures of risk sharing across euro area countries. We are going to express
the computed risk sharing measures in a difference in difference framework.
To be more specific, we are going to compute the three risk sharing measures
both with actual data and with synthetic data, across two sample periods:
1990-1998, and 1999-2011. We then take the difference of the risk sharing
measures obtained with the actual and the synthetic data both in the first
and the second subsample. We finally compute the difference of the two sub-
sample differences in order to get the difference in difference estimate. The
obtained estimates should tell us whether the adoption of the euro has had
any impact on the risk sharing measures that we are computing. In order
to test the significance of the estimate that we get, we compute t-statistics
using bootstrap techniques. In other words, we randomly drop one country
from the donor pool needed to generate the synthetic series and we compute
the synthetic series. We repeat the exercise for 100 iterations. We can then
compute the sample distribution of the synthetic estimate and its t-statistics.
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We now turn to describe which are the three risk sharing measures that we
are computing.
First of all, we compute correlations between consumption and GDP of each
country. If risk sharing across euro area countries has increased, we expect
to find a decrease in the correlation between each country’s consumption and
GDP. Viceversa, a decrease in risk sharing should result into an increase in
the same correlation as consumption would be less insulated from variations
in GDP. Secondly, we calculate bilateral consumption correlations across euro
area members. As noted before, economic theory suggests that a higher level
of risk sharing should increase consumption correlation between countries even
when their GDP correlation is low.2 If the adoption of the euro has had an
impact (either positive or negative) on risk sharing, we should find that our
difference in difference estimate of pairwise consumption correlations is sig-
nificant. The third measure that we compute is the bilateral risk sharing
indicator proposed by Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006). This in-
dicator, referred to as BCS index, captures the level of risk sharing between
country i and country j and takes the following form:
BCSi,j = 1− var(log Mi,t+1 − log Mj,t+1)
var(log Mi,t+1) + var(log Mj,t+1)
(1)
The numerator measures how far apart the SDFs of the two countries are
from one another, i.e. what portion of risk is not shared. The denominator
quantifies the volatility of SDF in the two countries, i.e. what is the total
portion of risk to be shared. This metric ranges between minus one and one
with a higher number meaning a higher degree of risk sharing. As noted
in Brandt et al. (2006) this index differs from correlation. Indeed, like a
correlation, it is equal to one when the two SDFs are the same, it is zero when
they are uncorrelated, and it is minus one if Mi,t+1 = −Mj,t+1. However,
differently from a correlation, it detects violations of scale in the growth rate
of marginal utilities. In fact, risk sharing requires the two countries’ SDFs
to be equal, not just perfectly correlated. Nevertheless, both the BCS index
and the correlation of SDFs are statistical descriptions of how far we are from
perfect risk sharing. In terms of computation, we assume that households in
the two countries have the same preferences and, in particular, CRRA utilities
with risk aversion σ = 2 and discount factor β = 0.95. Given this, their SDFs
2We are aware that there is contrasting evidence of this theory in the data. For example,
Baxter and Crucini (1995) find that GDP correlation is much higher than consumption correlation
even across countries which are known to share risk. More recently, instead, Krueger and Perri
(2006) show that income volatility in the US over the period 1972-1998 was not accompanied by a
corresponding rise in consumption volatility and they attribute this to the development of credit
markets, which played a crucial role in isolating consumption against higher income risk. In any
case, what we are mainly interested in is not much the level of correlation itself, but the difference
in the correlation obtained from the actual data and the one obtained from the synthetic data.
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look as follows:
Mi,t = β
(
Ci,t+1
Ci,t
)−σ
Mj,t = β
(
Cj,t+1
Cj,t
)−σ
.
2.3 GDP Decomposition
Following our preliminary investigation on consumption correlations and BCS
indices, our next step is to identify the different channels through which risk
sharing has changed. We carry out this analysis through a methodology pro-
posed by Asdrubali et al. (1996). The idea of this analysis is to check which of
the potential risk sharing channels absorb output shocks. In particular, this is
implemented by decomposing GDP into the following national account aggre-
gates: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Net National Income (NI), Disposable
National Income (DNI), and Private and Government Consumption (C+G).
According to this decomposition, each country’s GDP can be disaggreagated
as this accounting identity:
GDP ≡ GDP
NI
NI
DNI
DNI
DNI+G
DNI+G
C+G
(C+G) (2)
Because of the differences in the national account aggregates, the ratios on the
right-hand side can be interpreted as specific channels through which risk is
absorbed. The first ratio, GDPNI , accounts for income insurance stemming from
internationally diversified investment portfolios. This is because NI measures
the income (net of depreciation) earned by residents of a country, whether gen-
erated on the domestic territory or abroad, while GDP refers to the income
generated by production activities on the economic territory of the country.
Therefore, the ratio GDPNI captures the private international insurance channel
due to private cross-border investments or, as Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2014)
refer to, holding of claims against the output of other regions. The ratio
NI
DNI , instead, can be interpreted as the public international insurance channel
due to government taxes and transfers as DNI is the income that households
are left with after subtracting taxes and adding transfers. Finally, the ratios
DNI
DNI+G and
DNI+G
C+G account for smoothing through respectively public and pri-
vate saving channels.
In order to measure how much of the variations in output is absorbed by
each channel, we proceed as in Asdrubali et al. (1996). We first take logs of
equation 2, we difference the series, we multiply by the change of log GDP,
and we take expectations to get:
Var(∆ log GDPi,t) ≡ Cov(∆ log GDPi,t,∆ log GDPi,t −∆ log NIi,t)
+ Cov(∆ log GDPi,t,∆ log NIi,t −∆ log DNIi,t)
+ Cov(∆ log GDPi,t,∆ log DNIi,t −∆ log(DNIi,t + Gi,t))
+ Cov(∆ log GDPi,t,∆ log(DNIi,t + Gi,t)−∆ log(Ci,t + Gi,t))
+ Cov(∆ log GDPi,t,∆ log(Ci,t + Gi,t))
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Dividing both sides by Var(∆ log GDPi,t) we get the following identity:
1 ≡ βm + βg + βp + βs + βu
where we have defined
βm ≡ Cov(∆ log GDPi,t,∆ log GDPi,t −∆ log NIi,t)
Var(∆ log GDPi,t)
βg ≡ Cov(∆ log GDPi,t,∆ log NIi,t −∆ log DNIi,t)
Var(∆ log GDPi,t)
βp ≡ Cov(∆ log GDPi,t,∆ log DNIi,t −∆ log(DNIi,t + Gi,t))
Var(∆ log GDPi,t)
βs ≡ Cov(∆ log GDPi,t,∆ log(DNIi,t + Gi,t)−∆ log(Ci,t + Gi,t))
Var(∆ log GDPi,t)
βu ≡ Cov(∆ log GDPi,t,∆ log(Ci,t + Gi,t))
Var(∆ log GDPi,t)
All β coefficients can be estimated thorugh the system of equations proposed
by Asdrubali et al. (1996):
∆ log GDPi,t −∆ log NIi,t = βm∆ log GDPi,t + mi,t (3)
∆ log NIi,t −∆ log DNIi,t = βg∆ log GDPi,t + gi,t (4)
∆ log DNIi,t −∆ log(DNIi,t + Gi,t) = βp∆ log GDPi,t + pi,t (5)
∆ log(DNIi,t + Gi,t)−∆ log(Ci,t + Gi,t) = βs∆ log GDPi,t + si,t (6)
∆ log(Ci,t + Gi,t) = β
u∆ log GDPi,t + 
u
i,t (7)
where each β coefficient represents the share of income shocks smoothed by
a given channel. In particular, βm accounts for the share of GDP shocks
smoothed by capital markets, βg by fiscal transfers, βp by public savings, βs
by private savings. What is left, βu, is the unsmoothed part of the GDP
shock. A zero βu coefficient in the regression of total (private and public)
consumption on GDP, i.e. equation 7, means that a shock to GDP is fully
absorbed through capital markets, fiscal transfers, public and private sav-
ings, thus leaving consumption unchanged. Instead, a high βu coefficient in
the same regression means that only a minor part of the shock is absorbed
through risk sharing, while a significant part stays unsmoothed.
In estimating the coefficients in the above system we do not control for coun-
try size. In other words, the national account series of each country are not
adjusted by population or size of the economy. The estimation of coefficients
is carried out using the following methods: OLS with time fixed effects and
clustered standard errors, OLS with time fixed effects and panel correlated
standard errors, generalized method of moments, and seemingly unrelated re-
gressions. The inclusion of time fixed effects is important as it allows us to
take out euro area business cycle fluctuations. In this way, we make sure that
the effects that we find are deviations from the euro area business cycle and
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not, rather, fluctuations of the euro area business cycle itself. In the rest of
the paper our baseline estimation for the analysis of risk sharing channels will
be an OLS estimation with time fixed effects. We also perform OLS with
panel correlated standard errors, seemingly unrelated regression, and GMM.
In particular, in GMM we separately estimate the above described relations
using up to three lags of GDP growth as an instrument. The estimation proce-
dure, which follows Arellano and Bond – see Roodman (2009) – automatically
includes past values of the dependent variable as instruments.3
We show the results of these estimation strategies as computed in a difference
in difference model, which is equivalent to separate estimations. Namely, we
stack together our actual and synthetic samples and include the independent
variable interacted with the four possible combinations of actual/synthetic
and euro/no euro. In particular, the regressions that we are going to estimate
are:
yi,t = β0 + β1xi,t + β2Trixi,t + β3Eurtxi,t + β4(Tri ∗ Eurt)xi,t + νt + i,t
where xi is ∆ log GDPi,t, yi are the dependant variables in Equations 3 - 7, Tri
is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the series comes from the actual
dataset and 0 if it comes from the synthetic dataset, Eurt is a dummy taking
the value of 1 after the adoption of the euro in 1999 and 0 otherwise, and
νt are time fixed effects. β2 represents the share of GDP variation smoothed
by a given channel for our actual data before the introduction of the euro in
deviations from its synthetic counterpart β1. If our matching is successful,
we should find that β2 is not significantly different from zero. For our euro
period, i.e. for the period in which Eurt = 1, we should compare β4 with β3.
If the euro has had an effect on the analysed risk sharing channel channel, β4
should be significantly different from zero.
Provided that we have a good match for the pre euro period, we can be rela-
tively sure that the underlying difference in difference assumption of common
trend is fulfilled. We provide an example of this in Figure 2 which shows the
last dependent variable, ∆ log(C + G) (the one that delivers us the coefficient
of the unsmoothed component) for both the actual and the synthetic group
over the whole sample period.
2.4 Data
The data that we use for our analysis comes from the OECD National Account
Statistics. In particular, we use household final consumption expenditure for
C, general government expenditure for G, gross domestic product computed
following the output approach for GDP, net national income for NI, and net
disposable income for DNI.
Our initial dataset covers 31 countries, has a yearly frequency and spans
3In the interest of space, we only report OLS with clustered standard errors and OLS with
panel correlated standard errors. Results are robust to the other specifications and are available
upon request.
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from 1960 to 2014. However, as SCM requires the data to display no missing
values, in order to keep in our sample the greatest number of countries, we
limit our matching window to the period 1990-1998. This limitation leaves us
with 21 countries having a complete set of data for the variables we need. Out
of these 21 countries, 11 are euro area member states, while 10 are OECD
countries that are not in the currency area.4
With the aim of increasing the number of non euro area countries in the
donor pool for the synthetic control matching, we repeat the exercise with
data series from the World Bank. Again, since SCM requires to have a com-
plete dataset with no missing values, World Bank data only allows to increase
the donor pool at expenses of the number of euro area countries. Therefore,
in our baseline analysis we work with OECD data, while we leave World Bank
data to run robustness checks.
From the actual data the SCM procedure allows to generate synthetic se-
ries for the euro area group of countries. In particular, the SCM algorithm
produces the vector W = (w1, ..., wN ) of weights that maximise the matching
between the actual series and the linear combinations of non euro area coun-
tries in our sample to produce the synthetic series. For the sake of clarity,
Tables 1 and 2 display the optimal weights to generate the synthetic series
of GDP using OECD and World Bank data respectively. For example, the
synthetic GDP of Finland using OECD data is made of the Mexican, Swedish,
and British GDP in the percentages of 11.3, 40.2, and 48.5 respectively. This
is the linear combination of GDP series of the non euro area countries in our
sample, which best matches the GDP series of Finland. For each national
account series of each euro area country the algorithm finds the linear com-
bination of national account aggregates of the non euro area countries that
maximises the matching.
3 Results
3.1 Matching with the SCM
As discussed in Section 2.1, our first step is to generate the synthetic series of
national account aggregates to be used as counterfactual series for the euro
area countries over the period after the introduction of the euro. A sample of
our match is shown in Figure 1. The figure exhibits the actual and synthetic
series of household and government consumption expenditure for Finland.
The two series are very close in the matching period spanning from 1990
to 1998, and then start to diverge over the post euro period. Even if only
household and government consumption series for Finland are displayed here,
actual and synthetic series for the national account aggregates of all euro area
countries in our sample look similar to those reported. Given that the aim
4Euro area countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain; Non euro area countries in in our sample: Australia, Canada, Japan,
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US.
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of SCM is to get synthetic series, which are as close as possible to the actual
ones over the matching window, our matching proves to be successful.5
3.2 Bilateral Correlations and the BCS Index
The results for the exercise described in Section 2.2 are shown in Table 3.
As anticipated in Section 2.2, we compute difference in difference estimates
of three indicators of risk sharing: Corr(Ci, Cj), Corr(Ci, Yj), and BCSi,j
for any pair of countries (i, j). The numbers shown in the table are the
average of pairwise correlations or BCS indices across our panel of countries.
The first column shows the estimates for the full sample, the second column
excludes the crisis period, while the last two columns are estimates for two
subsamples, only core countries and only periphery countries respectively. All
our difference in difference estimates point to the same direction: a decrease in
risk sharing due to the adoption of the euro. In particular, the first row of the
table displays a significant increase in the difference in difference estimate for
Corr(Ci, Yj). This indicates a reduction in risk sharing, given that with the
adoption of the euro consumption and output within countries appear more
synchronised. The sample split results show that the reduction in risk sharing
is even sharper in periphery countries than in core countries. By excluding the
crisis period we get a dampening in the fall in risk sharing, that is a reduction
in Corr(Ci, Yj). The second row of the table shows the average values for the
difference in difference estimates of Corr(Ci, Cj). All the values are negative
(though not significant), meaning that the pairwise consumption correlation
has decreased with the euro. The last row reports the average values for the
difference in difference estimates of pairwise BCS indices. The estimates are
negative and significant for the sample which excludes the crisis period and
for the sample of only periphery countries, again implying a reduction in risk
sharing due to the adoption of the euro.
3.3 Risk Sharing Channels
3.3.1 Full sample of countries
The actual and synthetic series of national accounts are used to estimate
Equations 3-7. Table 4 and 5 display the results of our estimations for the
full sample period, i.e. 1990-2011. Each table shows both the estimations for
the actual and the synthetic series in the period before (pre euro) and after
(post euro) the introduction of the euro. In particular, each Synthetic row
reports the coefficient estimates computed with synthetic data, while each
Actual row reports the difference between the coefficients computed with the
actual and those computed with the synthetic data. Table 4 shows the OLS
estimates with clustered standard errors, while Table 5 displays the OLS es-
timates with panel correlated standard errors. In both tables the pre euro
period coefficients of the euro and non euro group are never significantly dif-
ferent from each other (i.e. the coefficients in the row Pre euro - Actual are
5In order to more rigorously assess the goodness of our matching, we will discuss the non-
significance of the pre-euro coefficients for synthetic series in the difference in difference estimation
in Section 3.3.1 and some placebo tests in Section 4.4.
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not significant), implying that the quality of our match is good. In the pre
euro subsample (1990-1998), international risk sharing significantly happens
only through the channel of international transfers, which absorb 4% of the
shocks to GDP. Most of the shock absorption happens through consumption
smoothing via public and private savings, which absorb respectively 14% and
35% of GDP shocks. The unsmoothed portion of GDP fluctuations is 50%.
The estimates of the effect of the introduction of the euro are displayed in
the row Post euro - Actual. With clustered standard errors, none of the
coefficients for the smoothing channels is significant. To the contrary, the
coefficient for the unsmoothed component is significant. In particular, we find
that the introduction of the euro increases the unsmoothed component of the
shock by 18%. With panel correlated standard errors also the private saving
channel is significant. As a result of the reduction of smoothed variations in
the private savings channel, the overall ability to absorb income changes is
reduced by about 18% (coefficient of the unsmoothed component) compared
to the scenario of no euro adoption.
A potentially surprising result is that we find no evidence of an effect of
euro membership on pure international risk sharing, meaning through capital
markets and international transfers. This suggests that the elimination of
exchange rate risk has not generated an increase in the component of output
variation smoothed through cross border lending and foreign direct invest-
ment. What might have reduced the unsmoothed component of the shock
is private savings, which is not intratemporal cross border risk sharing, but
rather intertemporal consumption smoothing. The Post euro - Actual coeffi-
cient for the private risk saving channel in Table 5 is negative and significant
at 10% (we will also show later in Table 8 that the same coefficient is even
more negative and significant for the periphery countries only). One pos-
sible explanation for this result could be that the decrease in consumption
smoothing is the consequence of an increase in GDP growth and volatility
due to the adoption of the euro. It could be argued that the common cur-
rency has triggered a boost in GDP growth for the countries which adopted
it, as it has eliminated exchange rate risk and increased cross-member trade
– at least before the outburst of the 2008 financial crisis. Figure 3 displays
how much the actual GDP has increased compared to its synthetic counter-
part. In the left-hand side panel the series of GDP for actual (blue line) and
synthetic (red line) countries show that, with the adoption of the euro, coun-
tries display on average higher GDP. The right-hand side panel exhibits the
cross-country average of the percentage difference between the actual and the
synthetic series of GDP and it witnesses an increase of GDP with the adop-
tion of the euro. Figures 4 and 5 exhibit measures of the increase in GDP
volatility due to the adoption of the euro. In particular, Figure 4 displays the
variance of GDP: the left-hand side chart exhibits the actual and synthetic
data variances, while the right-hand panel shows the percentage difference
in volatility between the actual and the synthetic series of detrended GDP
with a linear quadratic trend. In Figure 5 the same graphs are shown for
the coefficient of variation of detrended GDP. The left-hand side chart shows
actual and synthetic sample statistics, while the right-hand side chart por-
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trays the percentage difference of a coefficient of variation of detrended GDP
computed from the actual and the synthetic series. The coefficient is obtained
as the volatility of detrended GDP scaled by each subsample average GDP.
These charts provide preliminary evidence that the currency union member
states saw an increase in GDP growth and volatility after the adoption of the
euro, which were higher than the ones they would have observed had they
not adopted the common currency. We proceed by econometrically testing
this claim by means of a difference in difference estimator. Using the same
metric used in the analysis of risk sharing channels, we regress our outcomes
of interest, namely GDP growth, the variance of GDP and the coefficient of
variation of GDP, on a set of dummies spanning the possible combinations
of pre euro/post euro and euro/no euro. Table 6 displays the results of this
simple estimation. We find that the adoption of the euro had a positive and
significant effect on GDP growth, but also on measures of volatility, thereby
confirming the intuition provided by the graphs and providing a rationale for
the effect we found on the ability to smooth consumption.
A general and legitimate concern regarding our main results on risk shar-
ing channels is that they may be prone to measurement error driven bias.
This may be particularly worrisome given that we are estimating our param-
eters on data we may have generated with error. As it is well known, random
measurement error generates attenuation bias, which would bring our risk
sharing channel for the counterfactual data closer to zero than the true pa-
rameter. Because of the GDP variance decomposition, however, this cannot
be the case for all the parameters given the identity nature of our problem. In
particular, assuming that we generate our series with random error, we can
only have that the first four parameters suffer from attenuation bias, while the
last one in fact can be computed as a residual. If the first four parameters are
closer to zero than their true counterpart, this implies that the unsmoothed
share must be higher than the true value. Since we consistently find that the
unsmoothed parameter is lower in the counterfactual experiment than in the
actual data and we have no reason to believe that the actual data is subject
to the same measurement error, then our estimated difference in smoothed
income variation can only be a lower bound to the actual value. By the same
token, our estimated changes in the risk sharing channels can be viewed as
lower bounds since we consistently find that the channels would be more effec-
tive in the counterfactual and, given the potential attenuation bias, we may
be underestimating this change. This argument applies to the change in the
private savings channel. By adding up the relevant estimates we find that the
channel displays higher coefficient for the synthetic than for the actual data,
implying that if we were to measure the coefficient without bias, the two would
be further apart. In particular, the difference between actual and synthetic
estimate for the private savings channel, which is already statistically different
from zero, would be even larger.
3.3.2 Sample split in core and periphery countries
In order to evaluate potential heterogeneous effects of the adoption of the
common currency we perform the same analysis on two subsamples of euro
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area countries, namely core and periphery. The core euro area countries in-
clude Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and Netherlands, while
the periphery countries consist of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain. Re-
sults are shown in Tables 7 and 8 for core and periphery countries respec-
tively. The first interesting piece of evidence is that countries in the subgroups
adopted the euro with different levels of risk sharing. In particular we find
that core countries were able to smooth a larger share of output variations
than the periphery counterpart - this can be seen from the coefficient of the
unsmoothed component of the shock in the row Pre - Synthetic. This differ-
ence is mostly explained by the higher ability of public and private savings
channels to smooth consumption. Regarding the effect of the adoption of the
euro we find that for core, no channel is significant, meaning that the adop-
tion of the euro did not affect either international risk sharing or consumption
smoothing in the core countries. For the periphery countries, we find that the
adoption of the euro has raised consumption smoothing through private dis-
savings. In line with our main results, the overall effect is an increase in the
unsmoothed component of the shock by 34%.
4 Robustness Checks
4.1 World Bank Data
In order to assess the robustness of our findings, we carry out a series of ro-
bustness checks. The first one consists of using World Bank data instead of
OECD data. This allows us to enlarge our non euro area group considerably,
though one could argue that the newly added countries are probably not a
good group of countries for our euro area sample. The lack of Disposable
National Income in the World Bank dataset forces us to compute the mea-
sure from the raw series of international transfers from abroad, which is often
missing also for developed countries. For this reason our euro area sample
reduces to 8 countries. With this World Bank sample of countries, we imple-
ment the SCM to generate new synthetic series. For explanatory purposes,
Table 2 displays the matrix of country weights to generate the synthetic GDP
series. By running our GDP decomposition analysis on this synthetic dataset
we find no change in the results.
4.2 Match SDF on growth rates
In our previous discussion regarding SDFs, we first matched over the consump-
tion series of euro area countries and we then computed the SDFs with actual
and synthetic data. As a robustness check, we take another route to evaluate
the SDF pre and post euro. The alternative strategy is to compute the SDF on
actual data and, only after, to generate a synthetic counterpart. This com-
peting procedure is potentially more convoluted because, while usually the
matching is carried out on levels, the SDF is a function of gross growth rates
of consumption. To exemplify why this difference may be troublesome, con-
sider that one wants to check the SDF of Germany under two policy regimes,
pre and post euro. Then, matching on consumption levels would optimally
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put weight on countries with similar levels of per capita consumption. In par-
ticular, it is likely that the counterfactual is a linear combination of developed
countries. We may, instead, directly match on SDF, which ultimately results
in matching on consumption growth. This could result in the counterfactual
being composed of countries with completely different fundamentals, which
happen to display similar dynamic behaviour as pre euro Germany. Ulti-
mately, although both strategies are econometrically correct, their outcomes
may somewhat vary, and, thus, one may have different preferences on the two
competing procedures. We do not take a stand on which of the two is more
advisable, though it is worth mentioning that, precisely because of what ex-
plained above, they may deliver quite different results.
Both methodologies produce a very good match on the pre euro period, even
though the approach that directly matches on consumption does not perform
as well as the one that matches on growth rates once we compute the ensuing
SDF. This happens because with the former approach the synthetic series is
generated to closely resemble the level and not the growth rate of consump-
tion. On the other hand, with the latter approach we are able to reproduce
relatively well the dynamics of the SDF as we directly match on growth rates
of consumption and from that we compute SDF. Figure 6 displays the actual
and synthetic SDF for Greece over the period 1990-2011 with the matching
window stretching from 1990 to 1998.
4.3 Match on first differences
The main results in this paper are carried out by means of a difference in
difference estimation. Among the assumptions of this method, the hardest
to fulfill is normally the assumption of parallel trend between the actual and
the synthetic series in the pre euro period. This problem can be partially
dismissed by the use of the SCM since, if the matching is successful and the
synthetic series closely mimic the actual ones, the common trend assumption
is implied. However this assumption, which ensures that the dynamic be-
haviour of the actual and the synthetic series before the euro is close enough
to attribute post euro differences to the introduction of the euro itself, has to
hold for the dependent variable of the regression that is carried out.
In the results discussed above our analysis is applied to first differenced data,
whereas the matching is produced via covariates in per capita levels. In fact,
even though our matching on levels is such that the dynamics of the synthetic
series are very close to the ones of the actual series, this is not enough to
ensure that the first difference data will have the same trend. To address this
potential issue we replicate the matching by using already first differenced
covariates and outcomes, while still maintaining pre euro averages in levels.
In other words, when using covariates X0, we actually match on {∆X0,t}T ∗−1t=0
and X0, where the bar variables stand for pre euro period averages.
The reason for this matching strategy is that we want to replicate as closely as
possible the first differenced data, hence the matching on ∆X0. The drawback
of this methodology is similar to the one discussed in the previous subsection
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for the matching on levels or growth rate of consumption. By replicating
the first differenced data we may find some countries with similar year-to-
year changes, but very distant fundamentals from the actual series to be an
excellent match. In order to shield against this possibility we keep some
predictors in levels and match with a relatively homogeneous non-euro area
group, namely OECD countries.
The results of this estimation are displayed in Tables 9 and 10. As can be
observed, all our main results are confirmed, though their magnitude is par-
tially reduced. This leads to a reduction in the ability of private savings to
absorb income variation by around 9% and results in an overall increase in
the unsmoothed component of 8%.
4.4 Placebo test
A standard check to evaluate the robustness of an estimated treatment ef-
fect are placebo tests. In our case this involves a match on the pool of non
euro area countries that have never adopted the euro, as if they had actually
adopted it. Hence, in this section we try to find the best match for a country
like the US, which has never adopted the euro, as a linear combination of
other countries that have never done so. The idea behind this methodology is
that if we were to find any effect of the adoption of the euro on countries that
have never been adopted it, then it is possible that our euro effect is picking
up some spurious correlation.
Figure 7 displays the pre euro and post euro trends of ∆ln(C+G). The se-
ries behave almost identically in both periods, confirming the robustness of
our estimated effect of the adoption of the euro. After building a synthetic
dataset for all our OECD non euro area countries, we run the same risk shar-
ing decomposition we used for the euro area countries. The results of this
estimation are displayed in Table 11. All our difference in difference estima-
tors are extremely close to zero and never significant, meaning that we find
no effect of the adoption of the euro on our non euro area group.
4.5 Year of adoption of the euro
One of the identifying assumptions of SCM is that the covariates on which the
matching is carried out are not affected by the adoption of the euro. If this
assumption is violated the matrix of weights may be biased by the matching
on series which already incorporate the effect of the adoption of the euro. It is
not unlikely that some effect of the introduction of the euro took place between
the announcement and the actual introduction of the physical currency. In
this sense our approach is already conservative as it uses 1999 as year of the
adoption of the euro. This year corresponds to the introduction of the euro
as an accounting currency, while physical euro coins and banknotes entered
into circulation only in 2002. Evidence of anticipation effects has however
been already found – see Frankel (2010) for an application to trade. For this
reason, we run our analysis again using 1997 as the year of adoption. The
results of this estimation are displayed in Table 12. Our estimates are in line
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with the ones presented earlier as main result. In this case, we estimate a
significant increase of 15% in the unsmoothed component of an income shock.
4.6 EU Member exclusion
An additional robustness check is the exclusion of EU countries outside of
the euro area from our non euro area group. The rationale for this is that
countries geographically in Europe may have endogenously decided not to join
the common currency, as UK, or simply be indirectly affected by the existence
of the euro. For this reason we exclude these countries from our non euro area
group and run the decomposition. The results are displayed in Table 13. Our
estimates are very close to our main results but have now turned out not
significantly different from zero. A possible explanation is that our non euro
area group is now very limited since it only includes 7 OECD countries.
4.7 Exclusion of the financial crisis period
One could argue that, despite the time fixed effects, our result of a decrease
in the unsmoothed component of the shock might be driven by the turbulent
period of the financial crisis starting in 2008. Therefore, in our last robustness
check, we exclude the financial crisis period in running the regressions. Table
14 shows that even when we restrict our sample period to 1990-2007, thus
excluding the financial crisis, our baseline results are robust. In fact, the coef-
ficient βu for the unsmoothed component grows even further. In particular, we
find that 27% of an idiosyncratic variation to GDP would remain unsmoothed
against the 20% found for the full sample. This would seem to suggest that
the crisis period has actually increased consumption smoothing. Table 15 and
Table 16 show the regressions with the exclusion of the financial crisis for the
core and the periphery countries respectively. While the coefficient for the
unsmoothed component is not significant for the core countries, it is positive
and very significant for the periphery countries (0.42). This means that the
increase in the unsmoothed component for the full sample is driven by the
periphery countries. In particular, this decrease in consumption smoothing
is mainly due to a reduction in the shock absorption capacity through the
private savings channel (-35%).
5 Conclusion
This paper assesses the effect of the adoption of the common currency on the
ability of euro area member states to smooth consumption and share risk. We
do so by building a dataset of counterfactual macroeconomic variables for the
euro area countries without the adoption of the euro via the Synthetic Control
Method. We run a number of econometric procedures, namely the evaluation
of correlations between consumption and GDP within countries, bilateral cor-
relations of consumption and BCS indices across pairs of countries, and the
GDP variance decomposition introduced by Asdrubali et al. (1996), to eval-
uate the existence of this effect and the channels through which it may have
occurred.
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Our main result, which is robust to our different risk sharing measures and
specifications, is that international risk sharing across euro area member states
through both private and public channels has not changed after the adoption
of the common currency. At the same time, we show evidence of a decrease
in consumption smoothing across euro area countries for the period after the
introduction of the euro. In particular, pairwise consumption correlations and
BCS indices have decreased, while correlation between consumption and GDP
within each country has increased. Both indicate that with the introduction
of the euro, consumption smoothing has diminished. We report that the adop-
tion of the common currency has had a positive effect on GDP growth, which
has been accompanied by an increase in output volatility. We interpret our
result on the lower level of consumption smoothing due to the adoption of
the common currency as driven by larger shocks to GDP, which agents are
not able to insure against. We provide evidence of heterogeneous effects for
member states by splitting the sample into core and periphery countries. We
show that the euro has not affected the consumption smoothing of core coun-
tries significantly, whereas the aggregate negative effect that we find is due
to the decrease in consumption smoothing that has happened in periphery
member states. Finally, we show that our results are robust to changes in the
matching strategy, exclusion of potentially affected units from the group of
non euro area countries, and changes of the year of the euro adoption.
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A Synthetic Control Method
A.1 Synthetic matching
Figure 1 – Actual and synthetic series
(a) Finnish household consumption (b) Finnish government consumption
Note: The matching window is 1990-1998. The figure shows the actual series (blue lines) to be
matched and the synthetic series (red lines), which maximise the matching with the blue series
over the period 1990-1998.
A.2 Matrices of weights
Table 1 – Matrix of weights using OECD data (percentage points)
Non euro area Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
Australia 33 25.70 26.70
Canada 33
Japan 2 39.40 44.10 2.500
Korea 50.40 12
Mexico 2.400 2.900 11.30 12.20 5.700 44.50 7.100 0.500 40.30 27.70
New Zealand 1.800 8.300
Sweden 32.90 14 40.20 33.20 6.700 10.40 46.40 16.20 47.70 38.80
Switzerland 24 9 28.90 35.10 17.40
UK 48.50 12.90 56 33.40
US 5.600 45.10 36.70 27.30
Table 2 – Matrix of weights using World Bank data (percentage points)
Non euro area Austria Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
Brazil 14.30
Cameroon 0.100
Central African Republic 3
Chile 3.100 1.600 13.30
Comoros 1.200 4.900
Costa Rica 1
Denmark 59 50.70 55.50 65.50 42.60 31.30
Japan 14.50 2.700 26.40 5.900
Jordan 19 3.300
Lebanon 3
Madagascar 1.600
Mexico 3.800 12.80 2.200
Rwanda 1.700 2.400
Senegal 6.800 9.900
Sweden 70.70 3.700 85.50 18.80 48.20
Switzerland 18.30 15 32.40 13.20 17 0.500
Turkey 2.200 6.100 4 1.700
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Note: Table 1 and Table 2 show the matrix of weights used to generate the best
linear combination of GDP of non euro area countries to reproduce the GDP of
euro area countries over the matching window 1990-1998. For example, the Finnish
GDP using OECD data is best reproduced by a vector of Mexican, Swedish, and
British GDP in the percentages of 11.3, 40.2, and 48.5.
B Preliminary measures of risk sharing
Table 3 – Difference in difference estimates
All countries All countries Core countries Periphery countries
1990-2012 1990-2007 1990-2012 1990-2012
Corr(Ci, Yi) 0.19
∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(6.03) (4.38) (14.78) (13.49)
Corr(Ci, Cj) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10
(-0.29) (-0.28) (-0.13) (-0.72)
BCSi,j -0.07 -0.18
∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.08∗∗
(-1.47) (-2.62) (-0.27) (-2.05)
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. t-statistics
are in parenthesis and are obtained through bootstrap by resampling the donor pool
of countries to generate the synthetic variables. The table reports the average
across panel of the difference in difference estimates of the measures listed in the
first column – Corr(Ci, Cj), Corr(Ci, Yi), and bilateral BCS Index. In order to get
them, we proceed in two steps. First, we take the difference between the measure
obtained using the actual and the synthetic data both pre and post euro. Then, we
take the difference between the post euro and the pre euro differences. All estimates
point towards a reduction in risk sharing after the adoption of the euro.
22
C Risk sharing channels
C.1 Estimates of risk sharing channels
Figure 2 – ∆log(C +G) for actual and synthetic series
Note: The matching window is 1990-1998. The figure shows the actual (blue line) and synthetic
(red line) series of ∆log(C +G). The straight lines are the fitted trends to both the actual and
the synthetic series before and after the adoption of the euro.
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Table 4 – OLS estimated risk sharing channels - sample period 1990-2011
Capital Markets International Transfers Public Savings Private Savings Unsmoothed
Pre euro Synthetic -0.02 0.04∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(-0.20) (3.50) (4.43) (3.10) (6.57)
Actual -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.00
(-0.37) (-0.21) (0.03) (0.38) (-0.00)
Post euro Synthetic 0.12 -0.01 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.03 0.03
(0.97) (-0.52) (-3.01) (-0.28) (0.31)
Actual -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.17 0.18∗∗
(-0.02) (-0.57) (0.17) (-1.23) (2.18)
N 462 462 462 462 462
R2 0.20 0.11 0.67 0.54 0.95
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. t-statistics are in
parenthesis.
Table 5 – PCSE (het) estimated risk sharing channels - sample period 1990-
2011
Capital Markets International Transfers Public Savings Private Savings Unsmoothed
Pre euro Synthetic -0.02 0.04∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(-0.30) (1.87) (5.28) (5.21) (7.18)
Actual -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.00
(-0.59) (-0.20) (0.05) (0.63) (-0.00)
Post euro Synthetic 0.12 -0.01 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.03 0.03
(1.46) (-0.49) (-3.49) (-0.39) (0.39)
Actual -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.17∗ 0.18∗
(-0.03) (-0.53) (0.24) (-1.70) (1.73)
N 462 462 462 462 462
R2 0.20 0.11 0.67 0.54 0.95
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. t-statistics are in
parenthesis.
Note: Table 4 and 5 display the results of our estimations over the window
1990-2011 for the Actual and the Synthetic series in the period before (Pre euro)
and after (Post euro) the introduction of the euro. Table 4 shows the OLS estimates
with clustered standard errors, while Table 5 displays the OLS estimates with panel
correlated standard errors. The row Post euro Actual displays the effect of the
adoption of the euro. With clustered standard errors, none of the coefficients for the
smoothing channels is significant, while the coefficient for the unsmoothed
component is significant. We find that the introduction of the euro increases the
unsmoothed component of the shock by 18%. With panel correlated standard errors
also the private saving channel is significant. As a result of the reduction of
smoothed variations in the private savings channel the overall ability to absorb
income variations is reduced by about 18%.
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C.2 GDP Growth and Volatility
Figure 3 – GDP growth in euro area countries
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Note: The left-hand side chart shows the actual and the synthetic series of GDP. The right-hand
side chart exhibits the percentage difference between the actual and the synthetic series of GDP
averaged across countries over the period 1990-2012. Since the adoption of the euro the
percentage difference between the two has risen sharply.
Figure 4 – Variance of GDP
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Note: The left-hand side chart exhibits the actual and synthetic data variances, while the
right-hand panel shows the percentage difference in volatility between the actual and the
synthetic series of GDP detrended with a linear quadratic trend.
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Figure 5 – Coefficient of Variation of GDP
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Note: The left-hand side chart shows actual and synthetic coefficient of variation of detrended
GDP. The right-hand panel portrays the percentage difference of the coefficient of variation of
detrended GDP computed from the actual and the synthetic series. The coefficient is obtained as
the volatility of detrended GDP scaled by each subsample average GDP.
Table 6 – GDP Growth and Volatility - sample period
1990-2011
GDP Growth GDP Variance GDP Coeff Var
Pre euro Synthetic 31023.08∗∗∗ 3.45e+ 07∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(33.90) (10.26) (20.13)
Actual -1.88 320298.27∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
( -0.00) (6.50) (13.46)
Post euro Synthetic 5365.39∗∗∗ -5.03e+ 06∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗
(5.63) (-3.32) (-2.35)
Actual 7092.90∗∗∗ 5.35e+ 06∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(4.01) (3.53) (2.84)
N 462 484 484
R2 0.51 0.91 0.89
Note: In columns (2) and (3) GDP is detrended. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%,
1% respectively. t-statistics are in parenthesis. The table displays regressions of respectively
GDP growth, variance of GDP and coefficient of variation of GDP on a set of dummies spanning
the possible combinations of pre euro/post euro and actual/synthetic. The results show that the
adoption of the euro had a positive and significant effect on GDP growth, but also on measures of
volatility.
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C.3 Sample split in core and periphery countries
Core countries
Table 7 – OLS estimated risk sharing channels - sample period 1990-2011
Capital Markets International Transfers Public Savings Private Savings Unsmoothed
Pre euro Synthetic -0.17 0.04∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.27
(-1.76) (2.52) (8.54) (4.25) (1.60)
Actual -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.14
(-0.53) (0.29) (0.03) (-0.37) (0.77)
Post euro Synthetic 0.27 -0.01 -0.17∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗
(1.76) (-0.57) (-3.82) (-3.87) (2.35)
Actual -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.18 -0.15
(-0.11) (-0.75) (0.38) (0.92) (-0.79)
N 252 252 252 252 252
R2 0.32 0.16 0.74 0.62 0.96
Note: The countries included as core are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Netherlands. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. t-statistics are in
parenthesis.
Periphery countries
Table 8 – OLS estimated risk sharing channels - sample period 1990-2011
Capital Markets International Transfers Public Savings Private Savings Unsmoothed
Pre euro Synthetic 0.06 0.05∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.54) (2.86) (3.56) (2.32) (8.67)
Actual -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.01
(-0.02) (-0.90) (-0.80) (0.55) (-0.11)
Post euro Synthetic -0.02 -0.02 -0.07∗ 0.29∗∗∗ -0.17
(-0.13) (-0.73) (-2.14) (3.27) (-1.41)
Actual 0.04 -0.00 0.04 -0.41∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.25) (-0.12) (0.88) (-4.84) (4.26)
N 210 210 210 210 210
R2 0.34 0.23 0.67 0.63 0.96
Note: The countries included as periphery are: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain.
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. t-statistics are in parenthesis.
Note: Tables 7 and 8 show the following facts. First, before the adoption of the
euro core countries were able to smooth a larger share of output variations than the
periphery counterpart. Second, the adoption of the euro has not affected
consumption smoothing in the core countries, while it has decreased consumption
smoothing in the periphery countries by 34%. This is mainly due to a reduction in
the smoothing through private savings.
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D Robustness Checks
D.1 Match on consumption growth
Figure 6 – Actual and synthetic series of Greek consumption growth
Note: The matching window is 1990-1998. The blue line is the actual series of Greek consumption
growth to be matched, while the red line is the synthetic series of Greek consumption growth,
which maximises the matching with the blue series over the period 1990-1998.
D.2 Match on first differences
Table 9 – OLS estimated risk sharing channels - sample period 1990-2011
Capital Markets International Transfers Public Savings Private Savings Unsmoothed
Pre euro Synthetic -0.10∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(-1.89) (2.18) (4.28) (7.06) (9.87)
Actual 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.39) (-0.29) (-0.66) (0.30) (-0.21)
Post euro Synthetic 0.12∗∗ -0.04 -0.08∗∗ -0.11∗ 0.11∗
(1.97) (-1.39) (-2.30) (-1.66) (1.78)
Actual 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.09∗ 0.08∗
(0.10) (-0.25) (0.42) (-1.90) (1.87)
N 484 484 484 484 484
R2 0.20 0.06 0.47 0.53 0.95
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. t-statistics are in
parenthesis.
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Table 10 – PCSE (het) estimated risk sharing channels - sample period 1990-
2011
Capital Markets International Transfers Public Savings Private Savings Unsmoothed
Pre-tr Synthetic -0.10∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(-1.71) (2.34) (3.65) (6.51) (8.57)
Actual 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.39) (-0.29) (-0.64) (0.30) (-0.21)
Post-tr Synthetic 0.12∗ -0.04 -0.08∗ -0.11 0.11
(1.85) (-1.55) (-1.89) (-1.55) (1.57)
Actual 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.09∗ 0.08∗
(0.10) (-0.25) (0.41) (-1.93) (1.89)
N 484 484 484 484 484
R2 0.20 0.06 0.47 0.53 0.95
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. t-statistics are in
parenthesis.
Note: Tables 9 and 10 show that all our main results from Tables 7 and 8 are
confirmed, though their magnitude is partially reduced. In particular, there is a
reduction in the ability of private savings to absorb income variation by around 9%,
which results in an overall increase in the unsmoothed component of 8%.
D.3 Placebo Studies
Figure 7 – Placebo Studies ∆log(C+G) for actual and synthetic series
Note: The matching window is 1990-1998.
Note: The figure displays the pre euro and post euro trends of ∆log(C+G). The series behave
almost identically in both periods, confirming the robustness of our estimated effect of the adoption
of the euro.
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Table 11 – Placebo OLS estimated risk sharing channels - sample period 1990-
2011
Capital Markets International Transfers Public Savings Private Savings Unsmoothed
Pre-tr Synthetic -0.12∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.08 1.06∗∗∗
(-1.94) (4.15) (2.74) (-1.04) (14.91)
Actual -0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.10 -0.02
(-0.99) (-1.39) (0.66) (1.08) (-0.17)
Post-tr Synthetic 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.11 -0.25∗∗
(1.45) (0.41) (0.29) (1.05) (-2.53)
Actual 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02
(0.33) (-0.53) (-0.46) (-0.14) (0.14)
N 420 420 420 420 420
R2 0.17 0.15 0.57 0.31 0.93
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. t-statistics are in
parenthesis. The table shows that all our difference in difference estimators are extremely close to
zero and never significant, meaning that we find no effect of the adoption of the euro on our non
euro area group.
D.4 Matching over the period 1990-1997
Table 12 – OLS estimated risk sharing channels - sample period 1990-2011
Capital Markets International Transfers Public Savings Private Savings Unsmoothed
Pre-tr Synthetic -0.10 0.04∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(-1.03) (2.20) (6.47) (4.77) (9.11)
Actual 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.01
(0.09) (0.13) (-0.32) (0.10) (-0.20)
Post-tr Synthetic 0.09 -0.01 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.05 0.08
(0.80) (-0.60) (-3.34) (-0.45) (0.79)
Actual 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.15 0.15∗∗
(0.09) (-0.85) (0.14) (-1.11) (2.34)
N 462 462 462 462 462
R2 0.26 0.13 0.69 0.57 0.96
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. t-statistics are in
parenthesis. The table shows that our estimates when matching over the period 1990-1997 are in
line with the ones presented in Table 4 as main result. We find an increase in the unsmoothed
component, which is close to our baseline result and still significant.
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D.5 Exclusion of EU members from non euro area
group of countries
Table 13 – OLS estimated risk sharing channels - sample period 1990-2011
Capital Markets International Transfers Public Savings Private Savings Unsmoothed
Pre-tr Synthetic -0.10 0.09∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(-1.36) (3.64) (6.04) (5.21) (5.96)
Actual 0.01 -0.05∗ -0.02 -0.00 0.07
(0.06) (-1.82) (-0.68) (-0.01) (0.84)
Post-tr Synthetic 0.15∗ -0.05∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.04 0.07
(1.71) (-1.78) (-3.63) (-0.40) (0.84)
Actual -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.17 0.16
(-0.29) (0.80) (0.38) (-1.58) (1.61)
N 462 462 462 462 462
R2 0.20 0.16 0.69 0.55 0.95
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. t-statistics are in
parenthesis. The table shows that, when excluding countries that are part of the EU but not of
the euro area, our estimates are very close to our main results in Table 4, but are now not
significantly different from zero. A possible explanation for this is that our non euro area group is
now very limited since it only includes seven OECD countries.
D.6 Exclusion of the financial crisis period
Full sample
Table 14 – OLS estimated risk sharing channels - sample period 1990-2007
Capital Markets International Transfers Public Savings Private Savings Unsmoothed
Pre-tr Synthetic -0.02 0.04∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(-0.19) (3.56) (4.44) (3.08) (6.56)
Actual -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.00
(-0.37) (-0.22) (0.04) (0.38) (-0.00)
Post-tr Synthetic 0.32∗∗ 0.03 -0.14∗∗∗ -0.19 -0.03
(2.18) (1.11) (-3.14) (-1.54) (-0.28)
Actual -0.16 -0.05 0.02 -0.08 0.27∗∗∗
(-0.96) (-1.55) (0.33) (-0.60) (3.09)
N 374 374 374 374 374
R2 0.15 0.13 0.40 0.37 0.96
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. t-statistics are in
parenthesis. The table shows that, when excluding the financial crisis period, the unsmoothed
component of the shock increases even further as compared to the full sample period case. This
confirms that the result of a decrease in risk sharing is not due to the turbulences of the financial
crisis.
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Core countries
Table 15 – OLS estimated risk sharing channels - sample period 1990-2007
Capital Markets International Transfers Public Savings Private Savings Unsmoothed
Pre-tr Synthetic -0.17 0.04∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.27
(-1.76) (2.52) (8.52) (4.24) (1.59)
Actual -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.14
(-0.53) (0.29) (0.03) (-0.37) (0.77)
Post-tr Synthetic 0.41∗∗ 0.04 -0.21∗∗∗ -0.60∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗
(2.22) (1.25) (-3.43) (-6.61) (2.48)
Actual -0.25 -0.10 0.05 0.34∗ -0.05
(-1.42) (-1.56) (0.71) (1.93) (-0.35)
N 204 204 204 204 204
R2 0.32 0.19 0.58 0.49 0.96
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. t-statistics are in
parenthesis.
Periphery countries
Table 16 – OLS estimated risk sharing channels - sample period 1990-2007
Capital Markets International Transfers Public Savings Private Savings Unsmoothed
Pre-tr Synthetic 0.06 0.05∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.56) (2.90) (3.58) (2.29) (8.79)
Actual -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.01
(-0.03) (-0.91) (-0.80) (0.56) (-0.10)
Post-tr Synthetic 0.16 0.01 -0.08 0.13 -0.22∗∗
(0.99) (0.25) (-1.78) (1.28) (-2.35)
Actual -0.06 -0.03 0.02 -0.35∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(-0.34) (-0.93) (0.45) (-3.54) (3.82)
N 170 170 170 170 170
R2 0.32 0.26 0.37 0.49 0.97
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. t-statistics are in
parenthesis.
Note: Tables 15 and 16 show that the increase in the unsmoothed component of the
shock in the full sample – see Table 14 – is driven entirely by the periphery
countries, whose unsmoothed component increases by 42%. The decrease in the
consumption smoothing is mainly due to the private savings channel which
decreases by 35%.
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